1. Introduction

 The complex Spanish decentralization process has implied a radical transformation of the territorial organization model. This process cannot be understood without placing it within a more general context of transformation of the Spanish State, characterized by the practical simultaneity of three different processes: democratization, decentralization and European integration.

The first process, democratization, implied a process of change in society and an increase in social demands which motivated the quick expansion of the public sector, leading to its rationalization and modernization, and thus allowing the progressive development of a welfare state. This change favored the onset of the Spanish public sector modernization1, something that assumed, primarily, overcoming one of the strongest restrictions it faced: scarce spending capacity2; and, second, less involvement of the public sector in the economy.3

The second process refers to the intense political decentralization of the autonomous regions, which had just started to develop when it overlapped with the State’s necessary adaptation to the conditions of the European integration. Therefore, it may be said that both processes occurred almost simultaneously, transforming the old centralized State into a new one which expresses itself on different scales (local, autonomous, central and community) related to each other under complex and changing forms.

The decentralization process, with the creation of 17 ACs (CCAA, Autonomous Communities) and 2 Autonomous Cities, generated numerous functional and organizational tensions4 and difficulties. The new decentralization context is demanding an important institutional renovation of the public administration, with institutions and organizations which are agile and closer to the citizens, and which do not duplicate their services with others from the same administration or others.

The third process, European integration, has supposed a deep transformation of the State, which has even affected the currency. The entire economic policy, in particular the monetary policy, is conditioned by the decisions taken collectively among the members of the European Union. In addition, several administrative processes and internal operation rules had to adapt to the European harmonization needs.

Together with these three big processes, other elements with a more limited scope explain the evolution of the Spanish public sector  (see chart 1).

Traditional functions (justice, safety, etc.), which supposed an important percentage of total spending some decades ago, nowadays, lose significance in relation to the actions connected to social welfare.5

 

72 - International Journal - Art 1 - Chart 1

Structural reforms have consisted of the deregulation of some basic production sectors (financial, energy, transportation and communication) as well as the public sector companies, which have been subject to an important privatization process from the eighties, intensified in the nineties.

Meeting the demands derived from the European integration, together with certain hints that the Welfare state was under crisis in the early nineties6, obliged the State to make new adaptations. One of the responses was the decentralization of the public sector activity, thus completing the political decentralization with an internal one, of administrative and functional nature.7

To stop the increase in excessive spending, a series of measures were implemented, inspired in the increasingly influential New Public Management (acronym in Spanish, NGP). It seemed necessary to make a change in social values, perfecting political decision-making mechanisms and introducing management techniques which eradicate the practice of increasing budget allocations in a purely inertial manner.

The incorporation to the Economic and Monetary Union and the settlement of the Stability and Growth Agreement, as well as purely internal issues, obliged to make budgetary reforms. Therefore, a priority was the objective of returning the capacity of spending control to the Budget which ended with the approval of the General Law of Budgetary Stability in 2001 (amended in 2006) and the General Budgetary Law in 2003, which contributed to consolidate the budgetary balance culture in Spain and to mold the Spanish fiscal system to the European system, in its size as well as in its institutional design and its functions.

2. Phases of the decentralization process (1978-2008)

After Franco’s death and the succession as Head of State by King Juan Carlos I, a new political era opened which was consolidated by the triumph of the referendum of the Political Reform Law in December 1976, and the general elections that took place on 15 June, the following year. During the election campaign, all the political parties included in their programs the elaboration of a new Constitution and the establishment of autonomy for the regions. In fact, already in the first democratic Government, a deputy Minister appeared for the regions8. In the origin of this reasoning, the intention was to offer an autonomic solution to the Basque and Catalan nationalities, also including the less defined Galicia. However, with the onset of the unique pre-autonomy system, it could be appreciated that autonomy had a surprising social support9.

In 1979, the map of pre autonomous regions was closed, which, with very few exceptions, predefined the definitive autonomic map approved after the enforcement of the Constitution. In spite of all kinds of tensions which accompanied this process, the pre autonomy regime –which did not grant legislative competences– allowed analyzing and initiating the process of transfers to the entities created, in those issues that presented less doubts from the point of view of the future Constitution10.

Taking into account this background, the following phases can be established in the decentralization process (chart 2):

A first phase (1979-1983) in which the 17 Autonomy Statutes were approved and the decentralization process started, which was challenged by the Coup d’ état in 1981 and redirected by the 1981 Autonomic Agreements and LOAPA, and ended with the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1983, wherein the principles of the autonomic process were defined.

A second phase (1983-1992) during which the model was developed with numerous transfers and ended with 1992 Autonomic Agreements.

 A third phase (1993-2002) of implementation of the agreements from the prior phase (big transfers of education and health), within the political framework of the European Union and the single currency, in which it was attempted to close the model, but, which, in view of the growing discomfort in the autonomous communities (mainly the Basque and Catalan regions), opened a period of reflection of the entire model.

A fourth phase which started with the Basque proposal of a new Political Statute and the reform of the Catalonian Statute (October 2002), generalized a process of change in all the autonomous regions, giving birth to a new wave of statutes in different Autonomous Communities (Valencian Community and Catalonia in 2006; Balearic Islands, Andalusia, Aragon and Castile and Leon in 2007) which is still open.

 

72 - ingles - Art 1 - Chart 2

 

2.1 Transfers to ACs of article 151 of the Spanish Constitution (SC) (Phase I: 1979-1983)

Between 1979 and 1983, the 17 Autonomous Statutes created by the respective Autonomous Communities (ACs) were approved. The autonomic process started immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution, with the approval of the Basque and Catalan statutes in 1979, and the subsequent process of competence transfer to the so called “fast track” ACs (article 151 of the SC). Due to their quantitative importance, transfers in education were outstanding, and were divided in two blocks of subjects: those corresponding to non university education (transferred between 1980 y 198311), and those related to university education, which occurred some years later.

These Statutes were a reference and ceiling for the others. However, the wide consensus with which they were approved was broken when the discussion of the Galician statute draft arrived, and above all, the Andalusian, because the Government chose to differentiate the Basque and Catalan autonomy from the rest12.

Another especially important proposal was to establish “an identical competence minimum pattern”, with the recommendation that it be composed of organic blocks of subjects, to enable the ACs to effectively exercise the competences they receive and prevent them from importing the Central Administration’s defects. Finally, it was recommended to order the autonomic process by means of an Organic Law.13

Essentially, the report pointed out the need to articulate the autonomic process according to a general idea that did not appear in the Constitution. It was attempted to compensate this shortage by means of an agreement between the political parties, trying to prolong the consensus that was useful for the transit towards democracy, in order to organize the passage from the centralized State to the autonomous State, and in a few days, a practically total agreement was reached to apply the main recommendations of the Report of the Experts Committee. Trying to widen the support to this action program, negotiations were started among the four great state parties excluding the nationalist parties. Finally, only the UCD and PSOE signed the so called “Autonomous Agreements” on 31 July 1981, the Communist Party as well as the Alianza Popular refused to sign with strong criticism by the nationalist parties14.

These Agreements configured the definitive map of the Spanish autonomous states, which gave place to the quick approval of the respective Statutes, and included the application of the autonomic financing system as well as the preliminary project of an Organic Law of Harmonization of the Autonomic Process (its acronym in Spanish, LOAPA)15.

The initial phase of the autonomic process ended in 1983, when the Constitutional Court, through a judgment (STC 76/1983) cancelled a large part of the LOAPA, reinforcing the principle of autonomy in the State and the juridical position of the Autonomous Statutes. That same year, elections were held simultaneously for the ACs Parliaments, where the process was pending, and with the later constitution of the autonomous administrations, the entire system was enforced16.

2.2 Generalization of the model (Phase II: 1984-1992)

During the years 1984-1992, numerous service transfers were carried out17, from the Mixed Parity Committees which worked between the Government and each of the ACs. Due to their budgetary figures, the education transfers are significant. University education was transferred to Catalonia, Basque Country, Andalusia, Galicia, The Canaries and the Valencian Community between 1985 and 1986. Some years later, in 1990, the two packages corresponding to university and non university education were transferred to Navarra (Pérez y Morales, 2006:18). These transfers had a significant impact on the State General Budgets, where the education budget was reduced from 6,987 million Euros in 1984 to 5,730 in 198718.

The Constitutional Court labor, developed through several judgments and writs, shows the conflict during these first years of the autonomic process. As it can be observed in chart 1, the main causes of conflict were the different conceptions about autonomy from the three historical nationalities (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) and the central Government19.

72 - ingles - art 1 - Table 1

It has been pointed out that the change of State structure has been the result of an initial impulse of some ACs and some Autonomic Agreements signed between the two large Spanish parties by means of which there was a reaction to said initial impulse. It is evident that not all the ACs played the same role, because, whereas the ACs of article 151 in the Spanish Constitution (SC) were active protagonists, the ACs of article 143 in the SC were largely passive subjects of this transformation process undergone by the State.

Another fact that marked this period of the decentralization process was the performance of the transitory five year period set forth by the Constitution for the “slow track” ACs to be able to access the maximum competence ceiling. Therefore, since 1987, when this term started to be in force, the political debate focused on deciding how the extension of competences would be performed.

In view of the statute reform mechanism due to the ACs initiative, as considered in the Constitution, the Government was in favor, from the very beginning, of the transfer of a homogenous package to all the autonomous communities through an organic law, which caused quite a bit of criticism because, it was said, with the excuse of a rational competence equalization, the content of the statute reforms was conditioned, thus limiting the ACs freedom20. After months of uncertainty, in 1988, the Government offered a State agreement to negotiate as a block, the competence enlargement, which did not please all the ACs, to the extent that several of them (Castile and Leon, Balearic Islands, Aragon and Asturias) started to proceed with their own statute reforms, being in some cases approved by the autonomic Parliament and presented before the Courts. Finally, after a call to consensus by the Ministry of Public Administrations, the two largest state parties, PSOE and PP, reached an agreement on 28 February 1992, the Autonomic Agreements21.

2.3 Homogenization towards the closure of the model (Phase III: 1993-2001)

The February 1992 Agreements defined the extended competence ceiling of the slow track ACs, attributing to them 32 new competences with the purpose of making them equal to the historical nationalities. This was expressed in Organic Law 9/1992, dated 23 December, thus opening the way to the statute reforms pursuant to the terms set forth in said law, of the most handicapped ten ACs in the decentralization process.

Acting in this manner, the objective was the equalization of the general competence level for all the ACs, although during the process, transfers were delayed in the educational area until ending the reform started by LOGSE and health transfers were postponed due to their complexity, after the experience of the first transfers which created malfunctioning and an important indebtedness.

Concerning education, on the contrary to what happened to the “fast track” ACs, the “slow track” ones had access to the competences in university education first, between 1995 and 199722, and later on, to non university education between 1997 and 200023. Once these transfers had been concluded, most of the public spending in education was included in the Budgets of each Autonomous Community.

The progressive transfer of competences had its budgetary expression in the Central Administration, turning the amount dedicated to this budget of 7,530 million Euros (at constant prices) in 1993 into about 6,200 between 1997 and 1999, to decrease to half the amount (3,049 million) in the year 2000 and again another 50% (1,491million) in 200124 (graph 1).

 

72 - ingles - Art1 - Graph 1

The other important postponed competence, health, was transferred to the ten slow track ACs after the agreement reached among them and the Government on 26 December 2001. Through this agreement, the Central Administration transferred 140,000 officers to the different autonomous communities, together with resources for more than 12,000 million Euros intended to fund health during 2002. The health budget allotment in the State General Budgets, which had grown uninterruptedly since the beginning of the transition, decreased abruptly from 27,657 million Euros (constant ) in 2001 to 13,022 millions in 2002 and 3,068 in 2003 (Alonso, I 2009: 190-191) (graph 2).

The Government, upon officializing the agreement for transferring health, pointed out that the autonomic process was completed and immediately after said transfer, the Government proposed to the opposition to agree upon the “closure ” of the State.25

72 - ingles - Art 1 - Graph 2

2.4 Second Generation Agreement (Phase IV: 2002-2008)

Whereas the two large political parties started to explore the way to close the State model, and the so called “second decentralization” (reinforcement of the local power competences), criticism of the process was proliferating.

First of all, the Basque nationalism had been showing for a long time its dissatisfaction with the development of the autonomic model and the failure to perform its Statute integrally. In this context, in the Monographic Plenary about self-government dated 25 October 2001, Lehendakari showed its annoyance with the statutory blockage and pointed out the bases for a new political agreement. In September 2002, it announced the elaboration of a new political Statute for Euskadi, which was approved by the Basque Parliament on 30 December 2004. The text, sent to the Courts, was rejected by the representatives Congress on 1 February 2005.

In spite of the rejection of the Basque text in numerous sectors of the Spanish political life, this launched a debate about whether the autonomic model had to be closed or not, about what its limits were and the chances of fitting the different nationalities and regions into it. This debate favored the impulse of the Catalan Statute reform, and on 3 October 2002, the Catalan Parliament26 accepted to initiate the statutory reform process in the next legislative period.

In Catalonia, the Works for the new statute started in June 2004, although the principal developments occurred in 2005. Thus, when the debate about the Basque text was exhausted, the Catalan proposal started to be discussed in a more analytical tone. Among the most controversial issues were a new federally inspired model of financing and the protection of its competences. The text was approved by the Catalan Parliament on 30 September 2005 with the support of 90% of the members of parliament. After its proceedings at the General Courts, it was first approved by the latter and finally by a referendum in Catalonia, in June 2006.

Observing these two cases, it seems that history is repeating itself during the transition period. Different authors have pointed out this similarity, which was called “second autonomic process”. It is true that since Fall 2003, with the advanced Basque proposal and the reforming program of the new Catalan Government, it has already been perceived that the statutory reform process was going to be generalized.

The new aspect of this second autonomic process is that it was unforeseen and it is a new concept of better developed political autonomy which points at reestablishing its own political community, and finally, that the Spanish Constitution does not seem to be an insurmountable limit27.

In short, the autonomic model not only is open, but is also under full reforming process. The formerly approved statutes (Catalonia, Valencian Community in 2006 and Andalusia, Aragon, Balearic Islands and Castile and Leon in 2007) and those under an ongoing process (as Castile-La Mancha), have considerably affected the structure of the state and autonomous budgets due to the changes introduced in the financing system, and they will do it more in the future, as the new competences are effectively transferred.

Finally, it has to be pointed out that all these changes are not new. If we analyze the autonomous State historical development as a whole, the idea of constant evolution and flexibility turns out to be key in order to understand it.

3. Functional specialization of the Autonomous State by political levels

In developed countries, the weight of the public sector has not stopped increasing. In the early 20th century, the spending of public administrations represented between 10% and 15% of the national rent, in the seventies, the rate of public spending reached 35% and even 50% in some cases. This growth of public spending was accompanied by the transformation of its structure since28: 1) the relative weight of the pure public property was reduced, such as administration, defense and justice; 2) the percentage of preferred goods increased, essentially education, health and transfers; 3) public investment was significant in the first stages of the economic development, to decrease later, in terms of the total public spending and 4) the debt financial service shrank, although it revived in the eighties.

A strategy adaptable to changes, especially important, was the modification of the territorial structure of different Western States, giving good impulse to regionalization to improve the economic development, above all, of the most handicapped regions or with important industrial crisis29, or either giving impulse to powerful urban centers30 or States-regions31 that might be inserted in the global economy to provide the State the necessary resources to keep its level of supply of public goods.

This restructuring of the State also affected the hard core of the Welfare state, the classical manner of understanding social security and the other assistance services. In this manner, the rearrangement of the relations between territory and social protection is one of the consequences of the new connections of the State and the economy. Different factors (globalization, territorial competence and the disconnection between social assistance and market) favor a territorial plurality of social protection, giving the institutions with territorial decentralization, a protagonism which breaks the tendency towards centralization of social spending, a characteristic of the Welfare state. The configuration of the Spanish protection system and the role assigned to the ACs are a good example of this ongoing process32. Another two important strategies in the effort of adaptation were the European integration and the new techniques and principles of public management.

In the Spanish case, the three processes occurred simultaneously, connected to the democratic transition. In this sense, it may be said that the Spanish State has suffered a radical transformation, which besides, has happened in a very brief period of time, less than 30 years. The structural transformation process with widest scope has been undoubtedly, decentralization, reinforced since 1987 by the European integration. Both processes have in common the following: to suppose that the Central Administration would lose power, as well as redesign its functions.

The functional distribution of public spending by administrations shows the competence distribution of the Spanish public sector. The Central Administration (CA) has basically been entrusted with the traditional public service rendering (“defense”, “foreign relations”, “citizens’ safety”, “justice”) and, in addition, an important share of its spending, corresponds to “contributions to other public administrations and the European Union”. Its functions are made complete with “social security” and “public debt” service. The ACs dedicate approximately 60% of their spending to “education” and “health” services and a little more than 12% to economic services, fundamentally “transport infrastructures” and “agriculture”. Finally, the local entities spend 60% of the resources in “citizens’ safety”, “housing” and “community services”, “cultural activities”, “social services”, “transport” and “environment protection”. Once this is stated, there are competence areas which are shared by the three administrations, such as “transport”, “agriculture”, “trade”, “citizens’ safety” or “culture”.33

Therefore, all the political levels supply social services of one type or the other. Thus, “social security” controlled by the CA together with “health”, under the ACs responsibility, constitute the core of the Welfare state in Spain, without forgetting the numerous social services offered by the ACs and Town Halls (Ayuntamientos), within the area of their competences. Therefore, it may be stated that the politically decentralized structure of the Spanish state conditions its social dimension, that is to say, it is a complex or decentralized Welfare state. In other words, the model of welfare in Spain cannot be understood without taking into account its three main political levels (to which the Forum Council in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, and the Cabildos in The Canaries, must be added).

Another fundamental aspect of the State, when analyzed by political levels, is the eminently financial character of the Central Administration. The latter dedicates an important share of its budget to fund the ACs as well as the Local Corporations (LCs), something more than 37% of the State General Budgets, which together with the state contribution of 8% to the EU supposes that around 45% of the non financing budget of the CA is destined to financing other administrations. The granting character of the PGEs (State General Budgets) is worthwhile highlighting, because if other contributions to the public and private agents of the economy (public and private companies, families and non profit organizations, State organizations) are included, 60% of the non financial spending in transfers is reached34.

Recapitulating, it becomes obvious that in Spain there has been a strong decentralization process of the spending responsibilities towards the autonomic government level. Said process “has not supposed the central government’s loss of control of the global spending figures and public deficits, neither has it been performed at the expense of a reduction in the volume of public spending managed by the Central Administration”35.

In spite of the consecutive transfers of competences, the Central Administration has never stopped increasing its spending volume, with the single exception of years 2002 and 2003, due to the transfer of health.36 As a result of this tendency, the CA kept in 2007 a spending volume (at constant prices of the year 2000) of 233,682 million Euros compared to 129,011 of the set of 17 ACs (chart 2), so that the capacity of the central level spending almost duplicates the autonomous State’s (1.81 times). The CA’s public spending per capita was 5,168.77 Euros and the ACs spending, entirely, 2,853.59 Euros, making a total amount of 8,022.36 Euros per inhabitant, without including the public spending performed by the local level.

If the budget headings are ordered according to their relative weight (%) within each political level, the resulting map can be observed in chart 2, where the central level focuses its budgetary effort on “social security”, “transfers to other AP´s”, “public debt” and “infrastructures”, (76.3% out of the total). These four policies make up more than 4% of the total spending volume.

If the same operation is performed at the autonomous level (>4%), the main budget headings are: “health”, “education”, “infrastructures”, “agriculture, fishing and nutrition”, “social security” and “transfers to other AP´s” which amount to 78.08%. In the case of the CA, “social security” absorbs almost half the State General Budgets, whereas at the autonomic level, “health” and “education” are the ones that consume a little more than half (54.44%). From these figures, a first image of the State by political levels appears, with the CA in charge of pensions and of financing other AC administrations; the ACs, those of “health” and “education”; and sharing both levels, the investment in “infrastructures”.

Disregarding the “general nature services” and “defense”, both government levels dedicate significant resources to “agriculture, fishing and nutrition”, “citizens´ safety”, “employment fostering”, “I+D+i”,” housing”, “trade, tourism and pymes”, “culture” and “justice”. In these subjects, the central level spends 12.73% of its budget (29,747.71 million Euros constant) and the autonomous level, 17.61% (22,718.83 million Euros constant).

 

72 - ingles - Art 1 - Table 2

It is interesting to note that in “agriculture, fishing and nutrition”, “housing”, and “commerce, tourism and pymes”, the central administration spends 8,788 million Euros and the autonomous administrations, 11,212 million (chart 2). Considering that the quantities are similar in both levels, it seems that they are shared competences, when, really, they are exclusive of the ACs. It is the CA’s spending capacity what allows to actually convert these competences into shared ones.

Chart 3 indicates that the “general nature services” and the “financial and tax administration” show percentages almost identical in both political levels, whereas the “senior management” budget heading represents a double percentage in the ACs than in the CA, although in absolute values, its amount is similar (650 and 574 million). The higher cost of general services and tax administration may be explained by the presence of common institutions (Constitutional Court, Royal House, etc.).

 

72 - ingles - Art 1- Table 3 

 

To summarize, we can conclude by pointing out the functional specialization by political levels, highlighting the competence cores of each level as well as those other functions that are usually shared (by attribution or in fact) by both levels (chart 3).

 

72 - ingles - Art 1 - Chart 3

 

In this chart, the functions performed by the central and autonomic levels of the State are shown. In the case of the Central Administration, its core of activities includes, per volume, “ social security” and the “transfers to other AP´s”, to which three policies add, with their absolute control also falling into this administration: “defense”, “foreign policy” and “justice”.37 The ACs core of activities is comprised of “health” and “education”.

This core is wrapped by two rings that may be related to the performance of the own administrations. In the central government, it is formed by: “public debt”, “general nature services”, “financial and tax administration” and “senior management”. Similarly, the autonomous administrations contain these same functions, to which “transfers to other AP´s” and their “foreign policy” are added, that hardly have similarity with the same subject of the central Government, as in this case, it is the projection of the autonomous administration abroad, for the better performance of their own competences.38

 In the intersection of the two rings, there is a series of policies that share both levels. These subjects, in turn, may be disaggregated in two groups. The first is formed by “infrastructure”, “agriculture, fishing and nutrition”, “employment fostering” and “research, development and innovation”. It is a package of competences to which the autonomic and central administrations allocate 13.11% and 17.41% of spending, respectively. A second group is formed by “ housing”, “citizens´ safety”, “trade, tourism and pymes”, “culture”, “industry and energy”, and “grants for transport”. These policies absorb 5.32% of the central resources and 7.52% of the autonomic ones.39

4. Conclusions

The decentralization process has not been free from tensions. A source of conflict was due to the different conceptions about autonomy that the three historical nationalities and the central government had. The number and origin of appeals before the Constitutional Court show that these three nationalities (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) were the leaders of the autonomic impulse and contributed to a large extent, to design the State model. The autonomic agreements held in 1992 defined the enlarged competence ceiling of the slow track ACs, attributing 32 new competences to them, with the aim of placing them in an equal position in relation to the historical nationalities. This competence equality ended with the two last large transfers of education (between 1997 and 1999) and health in 2001. With these transfers, it was attempted to close the process. But the increasing satisfaction of some ACs opened a period of reflection about the entire model, which led to the proposal of a new Statute for the Basque Country and the Catalan Statute reform (October 2002), as well as the approval of the new statutes between 2006 and 2007. Nowadays, the review and approval process is still open, as well as the approval of a new manner of autonomic financing.

Another source of tension was in the resistance to change and the bureaucratic inertia from certain sectors of the Central Administration, opposed to the decentralizing, reforming and modernizing determination of the consecutive administrations. The structure of the State General Budgets makes it more difficult to calculate the effective cost and the concrete means that should be transferred to the ACs. In fact, they were difficulties derived from the need to use the information of some budgets thought to rule a centralist State, in a deep decentralization process and accelerated by political and social pressures.

For both reasons, on multiple occasions, the issue was solved by means of political negotiations and not based on technical questions. Therefore, it may be stated that the pace in the transfer of competences to the ACs, has been according to the composition of parliament majorities and to the need of reaching majorities of investiture or approval of budgets, rather than through a true State policy.

Budget analysis of the Spanish decentralization process allows stating that there is certain functional specialization of the autonomic State according to political levels.

A basic budgetary structure may be identified, a certain pattern in common, which explains the autonomic spending of most of Spain. The core of this common spending pattern is comprised of health and education budget allocations, precisely those with the highest volume homogeneity of all. Out of them, it may be observed that variation in spending is related to the financial capacity of each autonomous community, although the origin of the funds (endogenous or exogenous) marks a difference in the margin of maneuvering at the time of allocating resources.

The functional specialization of the autonomous State is related to the activity of each political level, apart from the lists of assignments of competences or qualification as exclusive, concurrent or shared. This explains that non exclusive competences of the ACs, such as “ health ” and “education” form part of the autonomic core, whereas others that, constitutionally and by statute, do form part, such as “housing”, “ trade, tourism and pymes (small and medium size companies)” and “agriculture”, however, have a shared nature, once its budget expression is analyzed in both administrations.

Finally, given the imprecision of the constitutional text, the existence of exclusive and shared competences (either belonging to the central Government or the ACs) has to be limited by agreements in time. In addition, shared competences, which constitute the majority of them, need the joint intervention of the administrations involved, with the consequent need of cooperation.

In closing, it may be said that the State model of the autonomous regions should solve some pending issues that management will mark the next years or decades. They may be summarized in two challenges.

1) Spanish central administration keeps on assimilating such deep changes as those that have taken place in the last thirty years and is still trying to adapt its function to the renewed Spanish State, marked by decentralization and integration in Europe. Although the degree of difficulty of the adaptation is understandable, and also that it requires time, the continuity of the adaptation process to all levels should still be demanded, including the administrative culture itself.

2) Autonomic administrations must also adapt to the complexity of the current State, articulating institutional discourses and mechanisms which allow the essential collaboration with the Central Administration as well as with the ACs administrations among each other. Today, the cooperation between the ACs to face common policies is scarce, in contrast with the usual practice in the rest of the decentralized States.

On the other hand, the ACs do not fully assume the political responsibility of their competences. In spite of the discrepancies about some of the transfers and the funding problems, within their current margin of maneuvering, they do not assume fiscal co responsibility.

 

 

1 The most significant advances which limited the Spanish State modernization were the design of the fiscal system and the labor market regulation. In view of the economic crisis in the seventies, at the beginning of democracy, the response was a political and social agreement (Moncloa Agreements) which incorporated the tax system transformation as a central element. Later, in 1980, with the approval of the Workers’ Statutes, the labor principles of the collective negotiation were developed (Melguizo, M. and Balmaseda, A, Sector Público de mercado. La Administración Pública que España necesita (Market Public Sector, The Public Administration Spain Needs), Círculo de Empresarios, Madrid, 2007, pages 22-23).

2 Between 1980 and 1995, there was a clear growth of the share of the total spending of public administrations in the GDP, from a representation of 31.7% in 1980 to 45.4% in 1995, supposing an increase of 13.7 percent points. However, since 1995 until now, similar to what happened in almost all the States of the European Union, a reduction of spending has occurred in terms of the GDP, being around 40% of the GDP (EUROSTAT, SEC-95).

3 Melguizo, M. and Balmaseda, A, Sector Público de mercado. La Administración Pública que España necesita, Círculo de empresarios, Madrid, 2007, pages 22-23.

4 For some authors, the autonomic model, due to the absence of a finished design from the start, would have gone too far, because of the excess of decentralization in relation to what the theory would advise from its point of view (Braña, F.J y Serna, V.M, La descentralización de las competencias de gasto público. Teoría y Aplicación a España, Editorial Civitas, Madrid, 1997, page 199.

5 The Economic and Financial Report of 2008 State General Budgets mentions that “this has been the legislative term of fiscal surplus, but it has also been the legislative term of the change in the qualitative composition of public spending, which has been oriented, preferably, on the one hand, towards policies with more dynamic effects on growth and the economical productivity, and, on the other hand, towards social spending. This is all within the framework of a process of quality improvement of the public services supplied by our administrations” (García, M.A, Martín, C y Zarapuz, L, Situación de la economía española. Presupuestos Generales del Estado 2008, Confederación Sindical de CCOO, Madrid, 2007, page 303.

6 This was mainly due to the structural public deficit, the frustration of social expectations, the incompetence to perform an efficient management of public services and the existence of perverse effects such as the “poverty trap” and long lasting unemployment.

7 Melguizo, M. and Balmaseda, A, Sector Público de mercado. La Administración Pública que España necesita, Círculo de empresarios, Madrid, 2007, page 24.

8 Clavero, “La organización territorial del Estado desde 1977 al año 2000”, in Revista de Administración Pública, Nº 50, page 39, 1999.

9 García de Enterría, E, La Administración española: estudios de ciencia administrativa, Civitas, Madrid, 2003. page 10.

10 Clavero, “La organización territorial del Estado desde 1977 al año 2000”, in Revista de Administración Pública, No. 50, pages 39-41, 1999.

11 Catalonia and Basque Country (1980), Andalusia and Galicia (1982), and the Canaries and Valencian Community (1983).

12Aja, E and Viver, C, “Valoración de 25 años de autonomía”, in Revista española de derecho constitucional, Nº 69. September-December, page 71, 2003.

13 Report of the Expert Committee about Autonomous States (1981).

14 Rubio Caballero, J, “Los nacionalistas vascos y catalanes ante la LOAPA: ajustes y desajustes en los inicios del Estado de las autonomías”, in Historia Actual Online, No. 5, page 67, 2004.

15García de Enterría, E, La Administración española: estudios de ciencia administrativa, Civitas, Madrid, 2003, page 11.

16 Aja, E and Viver, C, “Valoración de 25 años de autonomía”, in Revista española de derecho constitucional, No. 69. September-December, 2003, pages 71-72.

17 The transfer of the State’s services to the ACs was especially intense in this phase. Starting from almost nothing, it was calculated that, by the end of 1992, 31% of the public servants from the entire State (about half a million) were working for the ACs (López Guerra, L, “La segunda fase de construcción del Estado de las Autonomías (1983-1993)”, in Revista Vasca de Administración Pública, No. 36, 1993).

18 Alonso, I, El presupuesto como expresión de la evolución económica y política del proceso de descentralización español: el caso de la CAPV, Bilbao, Editorial Service of the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), 2009, pages 190-191.

19 Figueroa, A, “Los problemas para la definición del modelo de relaciones Estado comunidades autónomas”, in: Figueroa, A and Artaraz, M. (Coords), Poder Político y Comunidades Autónomas, Basque Parliament. Vitoria-Gasteiz, 1991, pages 26-29.

20 Muñoz, S, “Los Pactos autonómicos de 1992: la ampliación de competencias y la reforma de los Estatutos”, in Revista de Administración Pública, No. 128. May-August, 1992.

21 Montilla, J.A, “Las Leyes Orgánicas de transferencia en el proceso de homogeneización competencial”, in Revista de Administración Pública, No. 140., May-August, pages 298-299, 1996.

22 Madrid, Castile and Leon, Extremadura, Murcia and Asturias (1995), Castile La-Mancha, La Rioja, Aragon and Cantabria (1996) and Balearic Islands (1997).

23 Balearic Islands (1997), La Rioja, Aragón and Cantabria (1998), Madrid, Castile and Leon, Extremadura, Murcia and Castile-La Mancha (1999) and Asturias (2000).

24 Alonso, I, El presupuesto como expresión de la evolución económica y política del proceso de descentralización español: el caso de la CAPV, Bilbao, Editorial Service of the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), 2009, pages 190-191.

25 In short, the competence map became homogeneous, leaving aside the so called differential facts, which affect the language diversity, Civil Law, particular Institutions, such as the Cabildos, or financing institutions, such as the Economic Agreement (Aja, E and Viver, C, “Valoración de 25 años de autonomía”, in Revista española de derecho constitucional, No. 69. September-December, page 73, 2003).

26 It may be observed the practical coincidence of the starting dates of the procedures to elaborate the statute draft, with hardly a week difference.

27 Cruz Villalón, “La reforma del Estado de las autonomías” in REAF, No. 2, pages 77-99, 2006.

28 Comín, F, “Evolución histórica del gasto público” in Papeles de Economía Española, No. 37, page78, 1988.

29 Jones, B and Keating, M, Regions in the European Community, Clarendon, Oxford, 1995.

30 Sassen, S, “El reposicionamiento de las ciudades y regiones urbanas en una economía global: ampliando las opciones de política y gobernanza”, in Revista eure, No. 100, pages 9-34, Santiago de Chile, 2007.

31 Ohmae, K, The end of the Nation State: the rise of regional economies, The Free Press, New York, 1995.

32 García Herrera, M.A, Maestro, G, “Comunidades autónomas y protección social en la crisis del Estado social”, in Jueces para la democracia, No. 33, page 43, 1998.

33 Gil Ruiz, G.L. e Iglesias, J, “El gasto público en España en un contexto descentralizado”, in Presupuesto y Gasto Público, No. 47, pages 197-199, 2007.

34 Iglesias, J, “La presupuestación en un doble contexto de descentralización e integración: la nueva regla fiscal española”, in Boletín ICE, No. 2906, March, page 43, 2007.

35 Toboso, F. y Ochando, C, “Descentralización de las responsabilidades de gasto y evolución de los gastos redistributivos en la España democrática: un análisis comparativo”, in Presupuesto y Gasto Público, No. 26, page 157, 2001). Total public spending per administrations in Spain (2006) was 191,049.08 million Euros in the case of the CA, 134,372.44 for the ACs and 49,920.49 for the CLs. This implies in percentage, that 50.90% of the total spending is performed by the CA, 35.8% by the ACs and 13.30% by the CLs (IGAE, Advance of Budgetary action of the Public Administrations).

36 In 2002, there was a change in the financing model and this implied that the competence transfers from the Central Administration to the ACs were not performed through transfers as in previous occasions (education, etc.).

37 Justice is included in this main core of activity because, in spite of the transfers of certain means to the ACs, the CA is still, in fact, who controls this subject absolutely.

38 In fact, different from the State´s foreign policy, the foreign action of the ACs cannot commit the State on an international level, since they are not subjects recognized by international law. Consequently, in spite of the important boom of this phenomenon in recent times (Keating, M, “Regions and International Affairs: motives, opportunities and strategies”, in Aldecoa, F. and Keating, M., Paradiplomacy in action, The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, Frank Cass, London, 1999), it is convenient not to confuse these two diverse realities which are budgetary denominated in the same manner.

39 Finally, we have not included in the chart, the ACs spending in “education” and “health,” because it is the autonomic competence core, neither the autonomic management budget ocial s

5. Bibliographical references

Aja, E and Viver, C, “Valoración de 25 años de autonomía” (“Appraisal of 25 Years of Autonomy”) in the Revista española de derecho constitucional (Spanish Journal of Constitutional Law), No. 69. September–December, 2003.

Alonso, I, El presupuesto como expresión de la evolución económica y política del proceso de descentralización español: el caso de la CAPV (Budget as the Expression of Economic and Political Evolution of the Spanish Decentralization Process: CAPV Case), Bilbao, Editorial Service of the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), 2009.

Braña, F.J and Serna, V.M, La descentralización de las competencias de gasto público. Teoría y Aplicación a España (Decentralization of the Public Spending Competences), Editorial Civitas, Madrid, 1997.

Clavero, “La organización territorial del Estado desde 1977 al año 2000” (“Territorial Organization of the State from 1977 to 2000”), in Revista de Administración Pública (Public Administration Magazine) No. 50, pp. 33-56, 1999.

Comín, F, “Evolución histórica del gasto público” (“Historical Evolution of Public Spending”) in Papeles de Economía Española (Spanish Economy Papers), No. 37, pp.78-95, 1988.

Cosculluela, L, “Los Estatutos de Autonomía y los Pactos Autonómicos” (“The Autonomy Statutes and the Autonomic Agreements”) Estudios Regionales (Regional Studies) No. 44, pp. 47-65, 1996.

Cruz Villalón, “La reforma del Estado de las autonomías” (“Reform of the Autonomous State”) in REAF, No. 2, pp. 77-99, 2006.

Figueroa, A, “Los problemas para la definición del modelo de relaciones Estado comunidades autónomas” (“The Problems in the Definition of the Model of Relation State of Autonomous Communities”), in: Figueroa, A and Artaraz, M. (Coords), Poder Político y Comunidades Autónomas (Political Power and Autonomous Communities), Basque Parliament, Vitoria-Gasteiz, 1991.

García de Enterría, E, La Administración española: estudios de ciencia administrativa (Spanish Administration: Administrative Science Studies), Civitas, Madrid, 2003.

García Herrera, M.A, Maestro, G, “Comunidades autónomas y protección social en la crisis del Estado social” (“Autonomous Communities and Social Protection in the Social State Crisis”) in Jueces para la democracia (Judges for Democracy), No. 33, pp. 33-43, 1998.

García, M.A, Martín, C and Zarapuz, L, Situación de la economía española. Presupuestos Generales del Estado 2008 (Situation of the Spanish Economy, 2008 General State Budgets), Confederación Sindical de CCOO (CCOO Trade Union Confederation), Madrid, 2007.

Gil Ruiz, G.L. and Iglesias, J, “El gasto público en España en un contexto descentralizado” (“Public Spending in Spain within a Decentralization Context”) in Presupuesto y Gasto Público (Public Budget and Spending) No. 47, pp. 185-206, 2007.

Iglesias, J, “La presupuestación en un doble contexto de descentralización e integración: la nueva regla fiscal española” (“Budgeting in a Double Context of Decentralization and Integration: The New Spanish Rule”), in Boletín ICE, No. 2906, March, 2007.

Jones, B and Keating, M, Regions in the European Community, Clarendon, Oxford, 1995.

Keating, M, “Regions and International Affairs: motives, opportunities and strategies”, in Aldecoa, F and Keating, M., Paradiplomacy in action, The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, Frank Cass. London, 1999.

López Guerra, L, “La segunda fase de construcción del Estado de las Autonomías (1983-1993)” (“The Second Phase of the Construction of the Autonomous State”) in Revista Vasca de Administración Pública (Basque Magazine of Public Administration), No. 36, 1993.

Melguizo, M. and Balmaseda, A, Sector Público de mercado. La Administración Pública que España necesita (Market Public Sector. The Public Administration Spain Needs), Círculo de empresarios, Madrid, 2007.

Montilla, J.A, “Las Leyes Orgánicas de transferencia en el proceso de homogeneización competencial” (“Transfer Organic Laws in the Competence Homogenization Process”) in Revista de Administración Pública (Public Administration Magazine), No. 140. May-August, 1996.

Muñoz, S, “Los Pactos autonómicos de 1992: la ampliación de competencias y la reforma de los Estatutos” (“1992 Autonomic Agreements: Enlarging Statutes Competence and Reform”), in Revista de Administración Pública (Public Administration Magazine), No. 128. May-August, 1992.

Ohmae, K, The end of the Nation State: the rise of regional economies, The Free Press, New York, 1995.

Pérez, C and Morales, S, “La descentralización del gasto público en ecuación en España. Un análisis por comunidades autónomas” (“Decentralization of Public Spending in Equation in Spain. An Analysis by Autonomous Communities”) in Provincia, No. 15, January-June, pp 11-40, 2006.

 

Rubio Caballero, J, “Los nacionalistas vascos y catalanes ante la LOAPA: ajustes y desajustes en los inicios del Estado de las autonomías” (“Basque and Catalan Nationalists in the face of LOAPA: Adjustments and Maladjustments at the Start of the Autonomous State”) in Historia Actual Online (Online Current History), No. 5, pp. 65-80, 2004.

Ruiz-Huerta, A, “Los acuerdos autonómicos de 28 de febrero de 1992: ¿una alternativa constitucional adecuada?” (“The Autonomic Agreements of 28 February 1992: a Suitable Constitutional Alternative?”) in Revista de Estudios Políticos, No. 81. July-September, 1993.

Sassen, S, “Reposicionamiento de las ciudades y regiones urbanas en una economía global: ampliando las opciones de política y gobernancia” (“Repositioning of urban cities and regions in a global economy: widening the policy and governance options”), in Revista Eure, No. 100, pp. 9-34, Santiago de Chile, 2007.

Toboso, F. and Ochando, C, “Descentralización de las responsabilidades de gasto y evolución de los gastos redistributivos en la España democrática: un análisis comparativo” (“Decentralization of the spending responsibilities and evolution of redistributive spending in democratic Spain: a comparative analysis”), in Presupuesto y Gasto Público (Public Budget and Spending), No. 26, pp. 147-160, 2001.

Utrilla, A, “El sector público español en el proceso de integración europea” (“Spanish Public Sector in the European Integration Process”), in Cuadernos de relaciones laborales (Labor Relations Notebooks), No. 2. Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1991.