4. Where can fiscal
policies make a difference?
I would like to emphasize two
points in this respect. The first one is an emphasis on relative change to the
tax burden, away from manual labor and towards capital. The second one is the
introduction of a global tax to support the Global Social Contract previously
mentioned. None of these points are new; they have been debated for a long time.
Perhaps the time has come for these ideas to become a real policy.
4.1. Taxes on manual labor
and capital
With the growing sophistication of technology and the resulting increased
production levels -and the consequential decreasing amount of manual labor to
reach a certain performance- it is one of the great paradoxes of our times that
manual labor (employment) continues being so largely taxed. This is so in
general terms but especially in Europe. The "gap" continues being
important with respect to the contributions to social security by the employer
and the imposition on the people, each one corresponding to some 50 per cent of
the gross salary. At this stage everyone agrees that the taxes on employment
must be reduced. According to statistics by the European Union, the taxes on
capital were reduced by 10 per cent, on average, between 1980 and 1993, while
the taxes on manual labor were increased by 20%, on average.
This indicates a general problem. According to the traditional economic wisdom,
the taxes on capital gains should be low in order to attract more investment and
capital. But recent studies have shown that higher taxes on capital gains lead
to faster growth. Since the capital gains tend to accumulate in the case of
adults, their taxation reduces the tax burden on the young, leaving more income
for them out of which they may save. A higher tax on the capital gains implies a
more reduced tax on the work income, which provides the young with a higher net
income thus allowing them to save. Higher savings lead, at the same time, to a
more rapid growth.7
This is obviously a largely complex issue and it is manifested in different ways
from one region to another. Should "value changes" of property sale
and individuals' actions be taxed? Should both capital losses and gains be taken
into account? And the list could be continued. But, in the end, one of the main
issues of the tax regime of the XXI century -in an era of high technology,
unemployment and high capital gains- is how to design the best method to make
manual labor cheaper for the employer and compensate him by making the capital
more expensive.
4.2. A global tax for the
global social contract
The above is the most urgent, since the governments of both developed and
developing countries are discovering that their tax base is wearing away,
especially its capacity to levy taxes on investment income and gains and
corporate finances. In industrial countries, cash flows circulate throughout the
world, making it difficult to define the benefits for tax purposes and to
identify in which country the benefits to be taxed have been generated. The
other countries are subject to such pressure to grant tax concessions, tax
reductions and other incentives that they are the victims of an obsessive
competition by the foreign investment. This wearing away of the tax base on the
capital has increased the tax burden on manual labor as I have already mentioned.
Globalization has forced governments into imposing a tax on the production
factor that is less unstable, which has led to tax revolts. At the same time,
the large amounts of "speculative capital" have given way to a great
volatility in the financial markets.
How should we face the paradoxes and instability inherent to this state of
affairs? One solution is to develop a tax on the companies dealing with these
aspects of globalization. We can think of three possibilities: the Tobin tax on
the volume of foreign currency; a tax on the direct foreign investment to
support the labor and social reforms worldwide; and a single tax on the
corporate profits that reduces the establishment of transfer prices.
The Tobin tax
The Tobin proposal was
initially designed (1972) to promote financial stability adding a cost to
speculation. If at the same time it created income, this has been a secondary
benefit. Some time afterwards, the income derived from the Tobin tax became the
core of the debate on global taxation.8
The original Tobin statement imposed a uniform international tax on all foreign
currency conversions in cash. The tax had to be introduced simultaneously in all
countries and it had to be identical, so that the financial institutions could
not take their foreign currency transactions to a fiscal paradise and thus avoid
tax on the business volume. Such a tax would have the additional advantage of
restoring a degree of control on the monetary policy for the central banks,
which today have lost certain monetary autonomy and tend to become passive
repliers of the private financial markets.9 Tobin's original proposal consisted
of a 1% tax rate which has continued to be the reference point in subsequent
debates.
Over the last years the Tobin tax has mainly been seen as a possible income
source which could be dedicated to multilateral purposes. Tobin himself
suggested so in his 1978 article (see footnote) as a sub-product of the tax
proposed, not as its main purpose. Tobin himself considers that the main
property of the business tax is that it would automatically punish the comings
and goings of the short-term funds, affecting at the same time in insignificant
manner the trade incentives of the basic products and the long-term capital
investments:
"A 0.2 percent tax applied to the comings and goings of funds to another
currency exchange costs 48 percent a year if it is negotiated each working day;
10 percent if every week; 2.4 per cent if every month. But it implies a trivial
burden on the trade of basic products or long-term foreign investments".10
The Tobin tax would create a very important amount of annual revenue (hundreds
of billions of dollars, depending on the daily transactions and on the accurate
tax rate). There exists no other global tax creating so much income. It has the
combined advantages of a low fiscal tax rate with a minimum impact on capital
markets, low distortion effects and an easy management. The other new global tax
idea -echo taxes- would collect less, it would present higher rates and it would
potentially produce higher distorting effects.
Fixed capital taxes
I do not have enough time to
discuss the other tax possibilities that I have mentioned above. It is
sufficient to say that the companies have improved their ability to avoid taxes
through such devices as the establishment of transfer prices. There are two
possibilities that would once again secure the lost base through capital
turnover: one is a direct tax on foreign investment; the other would identify
more specifically the gains achieved in each country of operation and it would
focus the enigma of the establishment of transfer prices.11
7 For further information see Harald Uhlig and Noriyuki Yanagawa, "Increasing
the Capital Income Tax may lead to faster growth", European Economic Review
40 (1996), pages 1521-1540.
8 See, among others: James Tobin, "The New
Economics One Decade Older", The Ellot Janeway Lectures on Historical
Economics in Honour of Joseph Schumpeter, 1972, Princeton University Press,
1974; James Tobin, "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform",
Eastern Economic Journal 4, 1978, pages 153-159; Mahbub ul Haq, Inge Kaul,
Isabelle Grunberg, The Tobin Tax, Coping with Financial Volatility, Oxford
Univesity Press, 1996.
9 In this respect, see Howard M. Wachtel, The Money
Mandarins, M.E. Sharpe Publishers, New York, 1990.
10 James Tobin, "Prologue", in Mahbub
ul Haq et al, The Tobin Tax, op.cit, p. xl.
11 For those interested in further details, see
Howard M. Wachtel, "The Mosaic of Global Taxes", a study presented at
the Lecture on Global Futures on ISS 45th. anniversary, La Haye, October 1997. |